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COMMENTS
SEA HUNT, INC. v. THE UNIDENTIFIED
SHIPWRECKED VESSEL OR VESSELS: HOW THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT ROCKED THE BOAT*
INTRODUCTION
The mission: to locate a ship that plunged to the bottom
of the icy Atlantic over two centuries ago. Another day, another
week, another month, and still no hint of the shipwreck. The
odds of finding a needle in a haystack seem better. Suddenly, a
mechanical device capable of taking moving television pictures
illuminates the remains of the shipwreck as it drags slightly
above the ocean floor.
Immediately, in an effort to establish rights to the find,
the salvage company files the appropriate motions in a federal
district court. The court order gives the salvage company the
exclusive right to raise the wreckage .and its cargo. Under the
agreement reached with the state with jurisdiction over the
shipwreck's location, the salvage company and the state will
each take a percentage of the value of the items salvaged. Most
items will end up being sold or donated to museums for display
to the world. In the end, many will benefit: the salvage
company will receive compensation for its services, the
shipwreck will be saved from the further destructive elements
of the sea, and a piece of history will be preserved for
generations to come.
* @2002 Kevin Berean. All Rights Reserved.
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Suddenly, for the first time in history, the country who
owned the ship centuries ago, comes forward and asserts its
ownership to the shipwreck. The salvage company's attorney
calms his client and says, "Don't worry, the ship has been
abandoned by the country, so it no longer has an ownership
interest." The attorney then adds, "We have the weight of
authority on our side, and at the very least, you'll be entitled to
compensation for the salvage services you rendered." The
Fourth Circuit recently faced such an issue when it had to
decide Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel
or Vessels ("Sea Hunt III").1
This Comment examines who holds title to historical,
untouched shipwrecks, and whether a salvor is entitled to a
salvage award for the time and money spent locating and
ultimately salvaging a shipwreck. Part I of this Comment
discusses the two common law doctrines, the law of finds and
the law of salvage, which control conflicts surrounding
historical shipwrecks. Additionally, Part I presents an
overview of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, legislation
introduced in 1987 to protect historic shipwrecks as cultural
resources. Part II presents a detailed analysis of the Sea Hunt
decisions. The facts of the case are presented followed by the
decisions of the district court and the Fourth Circuit. Part III
argues that the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that an implied
abandonment standard is improper under traditional
admiralty law when an owner appears and asserts ownership
to the shipwreck is misleading. Further, Part III urges that
Sea Hunt, Inc. was entitled to a salvage award for the salvage
services it rendered on the Spanish shipwreck the Juno.
Finally, Part III answers the crucial question remaining after
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sea Hunt III: whether Article X
of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations
between the United States and Spain will preclude salvage
awards for salvage services on sovereign vessels of Spain.
' 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001) [hereinafter
Sea Hunt III].
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Jurisdiction of Shipwrecks
The reach of the federal courts extends "to all Cases of
Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction."' This constitutional
provision was codified in the first Judiciary Act of 1789 and
since then the federal courts have retained jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime cases.3 Federal court jurisdiction
includes "maritime causes of action begun and carried on as
proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself
treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or
description in order to enforce a lien."
The law of finds and the law of salvage are the primary
vehicles used by the courts to manage conflicts surrounding
historical shipwrecks.5  Although similar doctrines, the
determination of whether the law of finds or the law of salvage
governs the dispute is critical since each may produce differing
outcomes.6 Thus, some background on each of these doctrines is
necessary.
B. Law of Finds
The law of finds in the maritime context can be traced
back as early as 18617 and is still used to decide many modern-
2 See California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 501 (1998) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 1) [hereinafter Brother Jonathan 111].
3 Id.
4 Id. (quoting Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal., County of San Diego, 346
U.S. 556, 560 (1954)).
6 See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. The Shipwrecked Vessel, Captain
Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Fairport II1] (stating that
under maritime law, those who wish to raise sunken ships are governed by either the
law of salvage or the law of finds); see also Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, Believed to be SB "Lady Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1345 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
[hereinafter Lady Elgin 11 (explaining that the law of finds and the law of salvage are
the significant elements of maritime law).
6 See Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).See Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861) (involving the salvaging rights
over the steamboat America, which sank in the Mississippi in 1827. The court stated:
"The finder of things that have never been appropriated, or that have been abandoned
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day cases involving historic shipwrecks.8 However, the long-
standing principle of "finders keepers" can be found in the non-
maritime context as far back as 1722. 9 The common law
doctrine of finds treats abandoned property as "returned to the
state of nature and thus equivalent to property, such as fish or
ocean plants, with no prior owner."0 The first finder to lawfully
take actual possession or control of the abandoned property
acquires title to it. 1 Merely searching for an abandoned
shipwreck, or even finding it, does not give the searcher any
rights.12 Any salvor is entitled to search an area for a wreck
and to attempt to reduce it to his or her possession, provided he
or she is not infringing the rights of other salvors. 3 To gain
title to the shipwreck under the law of finds, the salvor must be
the first finder to: (1) demonstrate an intent to acquire the
property and take actual possession or control of it; and (2)
demonstrate that the property was abandoned." Each of these
requirements will be considered separately in turn.
The necessity to demonstrate possession was first
exhibited in the 1861 case Eads v. Brazelton. s In that case,
Brazelton found a steamboat which had sank in the Mississippi
River in 1827.16 After locating the wreck, Brazelton marked
trees on the bank of the river and placed buoys over the wreck
to indicate its location, with the intention of returning the next
day to salvage it. 1'7 The next day Brazelton was unable to
by a former occupant, may take them into his possession as his own property; and the
finder of any thing casually lost is its rightful occupant against all but the real owner").
a See Columbus-America Discovery Gr. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 460
(4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the law of finds is being applied to abandoned shipwrecks);
see also Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the salvor was
entitled to recovered shipwreck property under the law of finds).
9 See Armory v. Delamire, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (IKB. 1722) (holding that a
chimney sweep who found a lost jewel had title superior to all except the true owner).
10 Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 354.
" See Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1065; Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337
(5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Treasure Salvors I].
12 See Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 354.
'3 See id.
14 See id. at 356; Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 460.
15 22 Ark. 499 (1861).
16 See id. at 502.
17 See id.
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return to the site to salvage the wreck. 8 When he did return,
he discovered that a firm of wreckers, Eads & Nelson, had
located the wreck and had begun raising its cargo. 9 Brazelton
asserted rights to the wreck but the court held that he never
attained possession of the wreck and was therefore not a
finder.20 The court reasoned that "[t]he occupation or possession
of property lost, abandoned or without an owner, must depend
upon an actual taking of the property and with the intent to
reduce it to possession."2' The court stated that Brazelton's
intention to possess was useless without detention of the property..
. . [H]e was not a finder, in that he had not moved the wrecked
property, or secured it; he had the intention of possessing it as
owner, but did not acquire its corporeal possession; to his desire to
possess there was not joined a prehension of the thing.
2 2
In addition to possession, abandonment of the property is also
required under the law of finds."
There is a great deal of confusion among the courts as to
what constitutes an abandoned shipwreck, the second
requirement under the law of finds.' The principal area of
disagreement among the circuits is whether the abandonment
of a shipwreck can be inferred from the passage of time or from
the owner's inactivity." Courts have generally offered three
methods of proof to resolve this conflict: (1) express
renunciation of ownership by the owner; (2) implication from
an owner's inaction; or (3) passage of time and the lack of an
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See Eads, 22 Ark. at 511.
211d. at 509.
nId. at 511.
2See Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1065; Treasure
Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 337.
24 Compare Fairport III, 177 F.3d at 499-501; Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The
Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 387-88 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Brother Jonathan
III; and Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1065 (all three cases held
that abandonment may be found when title to the shipwreck has been affirmatively
renounced or when circumstances gives rise to an inference of abandonment) with
Columbus-America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d at 461 (holding that a finding of
abandonment requires clear and convincing evidence of an express renunciation of
ownership; thus requiring express abandonment as opposed to implied abandonment).
See Fairport III, 177 F.3d at 499-501; Brother Jonathan II, 102 F.3d at 387-
88; Columbus-America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d at 461; Martha's Vineyard Scuba
Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1065.
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identifiable owner." When salvors are unable to establish that
the wreck has been abandoned, they usually argue in the
alternative that they are entitled to a salvage award under the
law of salvage.27
C. Law of Salvage
Salvage is defined as "compensation allowed to persons
by whose assistance a ship or her cargo has been saved, in
whole or in part, from impending peril on the sea, or in
recovering such property from actual loss, as in cases of
shipwreck, derelict, or recapture."28 Successful salvors do not
acquire title to the salved property but rather obtain a lien
upon that property, allowing them to maintain a suit in rem
against the vessel or cargo itself for the whole or part of the
wreck that was saved.2 ' The true owner of the wreck retains
title to it until it is abandoned."
The public policy behind salvage awards is to encourage
efforts to save property from peril at sea while discouraging
dishonesty and embezzlement by salvors.31 Remuneration for
salvage service is meant to serve as an incentive for the risks
taken voluntarily by the salvors.32 To determine the precise
amount of compensation courts take several factors into
consideration."
26 See H. Peter Del Bianco, Jr., Note, Under Water Recovery Operations in
Offshore Waters: Vying for Rights to Treasure, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 153, 161 (1987) (citing
Brady v. The S.S. African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321, 322 (1960); Eads, 22 Ark. 499
(1861); Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 336-37).
See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d at 458; Lady Elgin I,
746 F. Su~pp. at 1339.
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 12 (1869).
2 The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 386 (1879). The vessel is also referred to as
"shipwreck" or "wreck."30 See Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356.
3 See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.
32 See id.; see also Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 207 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (stating that the consistent policy
behind salvage awards is that salvors will be liberally awarded so to hold out a
continuing incentive to undertake the risks associated with salvage operations).
3 See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14. The factors considered in determining the
amount of compensation include: the amount of labor expended by the salvor's services;
the aptitude, skill, and energy exhibited during the salvage operation; the value of and
risk to the equipment used to assist in saving the property; the degree of risk incurred
by the salvor during the recovery; the value of the property saved; and the amount of
1254 [Vol. 67: 4
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Three necessary elements must be established before a
person can lay claim to a salvage award: the maritime property
must be (1) in marine peril and (2) successfully salvaged in
whole or in part by (3) the voluntary services of the salvor.34
Each of these elements merits a brief discussion.
First, to determine if the maritime property is in a state
of marine peril, a court must decide whether, at the time of the
salvage operation, the ship encountered any damage or
misfortune that could result in destruction of the ship if the
salvage operation is not undertaken.35 Many things may
constitute marine peril. Threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a
ship in navigation are the major forms of peril to which a ship
may be subjected. However, this list is not exhaustive.36 The
danger of marine peril does not have to be imminent and
absolute; rather, the standard is whether the peril can be
reasonably expected.
Success of the salvage is the second element that must
be proved in order to claim a salvage award. To satisfy the
element of success under salvage law, thus allowing a salvage
lien to be imposed, all or part of the salved property must be
brought within the jurisdiction of the court.38 In 1869, the
Supreme Court stated that "if the property is not saved, or if it
perish[ed], or in case of capture if it is not retaken, no
danger from which the property was saved. See id&
34 See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 384; Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains
of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051, 1055 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980).
25 See Conolly v. S.S. Karina II, 302 F. Supp. 675, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
36 See Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 337. In addition, property actually lost
or in danger of becoming lost may also constitute marine peril. See Thompson v. One
Anchor & Two Chains, 221 F. 770, 773 (W.D. Wis. 1915). In assessing a salvage award
for a ship's lost anchor and chains, the Thompson court noted that if the anchor and
chains could be seen resting on a reef they would be in peril of being lost and the fact
that they were actually lost does not diminish or extinguish that marine peril. See id.
Moreover, even if lost property is discovered it may still be in marine peril due to the
actions of the elements of the sea. See Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 337.
See Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1968).
8 See Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 334-35; see also The Sabine, 101 U.S. at
384 (ruling that the necessary element of success means [s]uccess in whole or in part,
or that the service rendered contributed to such success."); see also infra Part I.A. for
more on the jurisdiction of shipwrecks.
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compensation can be allowed."' Indeed, under this traditional
approach success was necessary to the claim.40
Finally, in order to lay a successful salvage claim, the
salvor must show that his or her services were voluntary-not
performed under any duty or legal obligation.41 Under this
element of salvage, the court must determine whether the
salvor had a preexisting duty to perform the service.42 It is
irrelevant whether the salvor is a good samaritan or a
professional only seeking an award because motive will not
determine voluntariness.43 Owners of vessels sometimes have
the right to refuse salvage. When an owner is in control and
possession of the ship and there are no perils to human safety
or risks to property other than the vessel owner's, a salvor who
acts without express or implied consent of the owner will not be
entitled to a salvage award." However, if the ship is abandoned
by her owner, no consent is needed to salvage her.45 Under such
a circumstance, non-consensual salvage under abandonment is
permitted when any prudent person would have accepted it."
" The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 12.
'o See id.; see also The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 384.
41 See B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir.
1983).
42 See generally Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. 240 (1804) (declining to apply
the general maritime policy that denies the crew of a ship salvage awards for claiming
salvage against their own ship to a seaman who was the only member of the original
crew left on board and who undertook extreme danger to save the ship); Petition of Sun
Oil Co., 342 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding
that the crew was not entitled to a salvage award because they acted out of safety for
their own crew and ship rather than voluntarily acting); Sobonis v. Steam Tanker Nael
Defender, 298 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that a crew of men were entitled
to a salvage award because they acted beyond the scope of their employment and thus
met the voluntariness requirement).
See B. V. Bureau Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d at 339.
44 See Bonifay v. The Paraporti, 145 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Va. 1956) (citing
Cuttyhunk Boat Lines v. The Pendleton, D.C., 119 F. Supp. 608 (1954)) (holding that
salvage services performed without express or implied consent of the owner resulted in
no salvage award); F.E. Grauwiller Transp. Co. v. King, 131 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y.
1955), affd, 229 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1956) (salvor was repeatedly told by vessel owner to
cease and thus was not entitled to a salvage award).
41 See Merrit & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. United States, 274 U.S.
611, 613 (1927).
46 See id.
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D. Law of Finds v. Law of Salvage
Once an in rem action has been filed and jurisdiction
has been established, admiralty courts must decide whether
the law of finds or the law of salvage applies. Title vests in the
salvor under the law of finds, while title of the wreck will
remain with the owner under the law of salvage.48
The law of finds is concerned primarily with title.49
Under the law of finds "if either intent or possession is lacking,
the would-be finder receives nothing; neither effort alone nor
acquisition unaccompanied by the required intent is
rewarded."50 Further, if it is decided that the property was not
abandoned, the law of finds permits no reward regardless of
the effort or level of success in recovering the property.5
On the other hand, the law of salvage is concerned
primarily with the preservation of property on oceans and
waterways.52 Salvage law grants a possessory interest in the
salvor for the purpose of saving the property from destruction,
damage, or loss, and it allows the salvor to retain the property
until proper compensation has been paid." Unlike the law of
finds, a salvor need not have the intention to acquire the
property; it is enough that the salvor merely have the intention
and capacity to save it.54
Moreover, the meaning of "possession" in the law of
salvage carries a more relaxed meaning than in the law of
finds.55 A salvor does not need to establish the most secure
possession under the circumstances, rather he only needs "a
possession secure enough to warrant finding a right to perform
service and a right to a just reward."5 6 Finally, unlike a
47 See generally Columbus.America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d at 460; Martha's
Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1064-65; Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 358. In all
three cases the court had to determine as a preliminary matter whether the law of
finds or the law of salvage applied to the facts in each respective case.4 8 See MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 631
F. Supp. 308, 311-12 (S.D. Fla. 1986).49 See Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356.
so Id.5 1 See id. (citing Watts v. Ward, 1 Or. 86, 62 Am. Dec. 299 (1854)).
52 See id.
6 See id.
" See Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356.
55See id at 357.
56 Id.
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potential finder, the salvor receives a payment, depending on
the value of the rendered service." Whether a wreck is held to
be abandoned is critical in determining which law applies and
who owns the ship.58 Although the law of finds and the law of
salvage have been the two primary doctrines governing the
disposition of discovered shipwrecks, legislative action has
altered this approach. 59 Key legislation affecting this area of
the law is discussed in the following section.
E. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987°
1. The Need for the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
The purpose of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act ("ASA" or
"the Act") is to "vest title to certain abandoned historic
shipwrecks that are buried in State lands to the respective
States and to clarify the management authority of the states
for these abandoned historic shipwrecks."6' The Act was a
response to the need to protect historic shipwrecks as cultural
resources. 2 There are an estimated 50,000 shipwrecks located
within the navigable waters of the United States, and of those
wrecks, five to ten percent are of historical significance.' The
technological boom has made access to these shipwrecks much
easier, thereby increasing interest in them.' Consequently,
these historic shipwrecks were being subjected to multiple use
demands, from sport divers with a recreational interest,
underwater archaeologists concerned with preservation, and
salvors focused on commercial interests. 5 The Act was also
drafted in response to the confusion that existed over the
57 See id. at 357-58.
58 See id. at 356-57.
See Fairport II, 105 F.3d at 1081-83.
60 43 U.S.C §§ 2101-2106 (2000).
6' H.R. REP. No. 100-514, pt. I at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.&N 365,
365.
62 See id.
6 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
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ownership and authority to manage abandoned shipwrecks."6
Individual states were claiming title to historic shipwrecks
located on submerged lands under their jurisdiction, while the
federal admiralty courts were also asserting jurisdiction over
the wrecks.67
In 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Acte
("SLA") which transferred ownership of all natural resources
and submerged lands, out to a distance of three miles, to the
individual states.69 However, Congress did not specify in the
SLA whether states owned non-natural resources such as
abandoned shipwrecks located within the states' submerged
lands.70 Despite this lack of clarity, twenty-eight states passed
laws pertaining to the management of historic shipwrecks in
state waters.7' However, many states were constrained in
applying those shipwreck management and preservation laws
due to conflicts with federal admiralty principles and mixed
judicial decisions.72 Under Article III, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1333, 73 federal district
courts have original jurisdiction over all maritime and
admiralty cases.74 When exercising this jurisdiction the federal
courts applied the common law principles of admiralty, which
include the law of finds and law of salvage.75
Under the law of finds, the finder of an abandoned
shipwreck receives title.76 Under the law of salvage, the owner
of the wreck retains title but the salvor may be entitled to a
salvage award.77 However, when faced with salvage claims, a
H.R. REP. No. 100-514 pt. I at 2.
6 See id.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.(2000).
" See H.R. REP. No. 100-514 pt. I1 In Texas, Puerto Rico, and the West Coast
of Florida the boundary is nine miles.
70 See id.
71 See id.
7 See id.
73 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) provides that "[tihe district courts shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil cases of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all the other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled, (2) any prize brought into the United States and
all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as a prize."
74 See H.R. REP. No. 100-514 pt. II.
75 See id.
76 See Fairport III, 177 F.3d at 498.
77 See The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 386.
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majority of the federal courts concluded that "(1) the SLA did
not specifically assert U.S. title to shipwrecks and transfer that
title to the states; and (2) state historic preservation laws
whose provisions are inconsistent with federal common law
admiralty principles are superseded by those principles under
the supremacy clause of the Constitution."78 A minority of the
federal courts disagreed and instead held that the SLA did
provide states with jurisdiction over shipwrecks in state
waters." Congress concluded that these inconsistent federal
court decisions had resulted in confusion over ownership of,
and responsibility for, historic shipwrecks." This confusion
prompted legislation that would eventually become the ASA."l
2. Elements of the ASA
The first requirement under the ASA is that the
shipwreck must be abandoned for the Act to be applicable.82
Next, to be covered by the ASA, the abandoned shipwreck must
be "(1) embedded in submerged lands of a state; (2) embedded
in coralline formations protected by a state on submerged
lands of a state; or (3) on submerged lands of a state and...
included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National
Register."8 If these requirements are met, the United States
asserts title to the shipwreck and thereafter transfers title to
the state on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located.'
Of particular importance is § 2106(a) of the ASA, which
provides that "the law of salvage and the law of finds shall not
apply to abandoned shipwrecks to which Section 2105 of this
title applies." 5 Therefore, a finding of abandonment, in the
absence of a state law providing otherwise, will leave the salvor
" H.R. REP. No. 100-514 pt. II (citing Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. The Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330
(5th Cir. 1978)).
79 See id. (citing Subaqueous Exploration & Archaeology, Ltd., v. The
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597 (D. Md. 1983)).
See H.R. REP. No. 100-514 pt. II.
81 See id.
8See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (2000).
" See id.
See id. § 2105(c).
85 See id. § 2106(a).
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with neither title nor a salvage award because traditional
admiralty law will not apply. 6 If, however, the shipwreck is
found not to have been abandoned then traditional admiralty
law prevails and the law of finds applies." Thus, the key
element is abandonment, as the ASA cannot be triggered
without such a finding.88
The problem is that the ASA does not define
abandonment; and so, while the Act attempts to clarify these
shipwreck controversies, it has not been wholly successful due
to disputes concerning the standard of proof required for
abandonment. 9
F. Recent Developments in Shipwreck Law
On April 22, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court announced
the decision of California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. ("Brother
Jonathan III").! Deep Sea Research had located the Brother
Jonathan, a ship that sank off the coast of California in 1865,
and sought rights to the wreck under the federal district court's
in rem admiralty jurisdiction.9' California intervened and
claimed title to the wreck under the ASA and argued that Deep
Sea Research's in rem action was a violation of the Eleventh
Amendment.92 Deep Sea Research countered that the ASA
could not divest the federal courts of the exclusive admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction conferred by Article III, Section 2 of
the United States Constitution.93 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the interplay between federal court
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the state's Eleventh
See Fairport I, 105 F.3d at 1082.
See 43 U.S.C. §§ 2105(a)-2106(a).
See id. § 2105(a) (requiring abandonment before any other elemental
analysis can take place).
See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 638-40.
0523 U.S. 491 (1998).
" See id. at 495-96.
9See id. at 496. California asserted it had title to the wreck either under the
ASA or under § 1613 of the California Public Resources Code and claimed that a suit in
rem over the wreck was thus prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. California
argued that the under the Eleventh Amendment federal courts must dismiss an action
in rem when a state intervenes, so long as the state's claim of title is colorable. See id.
at 496-97.
"See id. at 497. See also supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the jurisdiction of shipwrecks.
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Amendment immunity, and whether the Brother Jonathan was
subject to the ASA.94 The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar federal court jurisdiction over
shipwreck claims falling under the ASA.95
The ruling ended the jurisdictional dispute but failed to
address whether the Brother Jonathan was abandoned and
was therefore subject to the ASA.96 The Court found that the
Ninth Circuit had decided the wreck was not abandoned based
on jurisdictional concerns; therefore, the Court declined to
resolve whether the shipwreck had been abandoned within the
meaning of the ASA and instead remanded the case for further
proceedings." Although the Court failed to resolve the circuit
split over the definition of abandonment under the ASA, it did
provide some guidance by recommending that on remand the
lower court should find that "the meaning of 'abandoned' under
the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law."8
Against this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit decided Sea Hunt
III. Part II presents a detailed analysis of the Sea Hunt
decisions.
II. SEA HUNT, INC. V. UNIDENTIFIED SHIPWRECKED VESSEL
OR VESSELS, THEIR APPAREL, TACKLE,
APPURTENANCES, AND CARGO LOCATED WITHIN
COORDINATES 38 DEGREES 01' 36" NORTH LATITUDE, 75
DEGREES 1433" WEST LONGITUDE ET AL.
9 9
The days of scouring the seas for long lost Spanish
shipwrecks filled with riches recently received a nasty legal jolt
in Sea Hunt III. Sea Hunt marked the first time in history that
Spain laid legal claim to one of its many shipwrecks and
prevailed in its legal battle to retain title to the shipwrecks and
to refuse salvage activities.' ° This Part discusses the relevant
facts of the case, the procedural history, and the court's
reasoning.
See Brother Jonathan III, 523 U.S at 500-01.
9' See id. at 507-08.
9 See id. at 508-09.
97 See id.
" Id. at 508.
9221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000).
'0o Id. at 647.
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A. Facts
1. The La Galga
Two Spanish naval vessels, the La Galga and the Juno,
sank off the coast of present-day Virginia in 1750 and 1802,
respectively.'' The La Galga was commissioned by the Spanish
Navy in 1732 and initially served as part of Spain's
Mediterranean Fleet.'0 However, from 1736 to the day the ship
went down, the La Galga served as a convoy escort charged
with escorting merchant ships.0 3
On August 7, 1750, the La Galga, carrying the Second
Company of the Sixth Battalion of Spanish Marines, was
directed to escort a convoy of merchant ships across the
Atlantic Ocean to Cadiz.'" Unfortunately, that would be the La
Galga's last voyage.15 Eleven days into the journey, the La
Galga ran into a hurricane near Bermuda.'w The storm
separated the ships and forced them towards the present
United States' coast. 7 On August 25, 1750, the La Galga sank
off the coast of the Eastern Shore near the present-day
Maryland/Virginia border.0 8 Luckily, most of the crew on board
reached land safely.0 9
After the ship sank, the commander of the La Galga
attempted to salvage items from the wreck but was hindered
from doing so due to the pillaging and looting of the ship by
local residents."0 Eventually, the commander was able to
obtain the help of the Maryland Governor in protecting the
wreck from the pillaging and looting, but before salvage efforts
could be resumed a second storm hit and broke apart what was
'0' See Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 47 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 680-81 (E.D. Va. 1999) [hereinafter Sea Hunt 1].
"02 See id. at 680.
103 See id.
10 See id
10 See id at 680-81.106 See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
107 See id.108 See id
109 See id.
110 See id.
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left of the ship."' No more salvage efforts took place until
approximately two hundred and fifty years later when Sea
Hunt, Inc. ("Sea Hunt"), a privately owned shipwreck salvage
company, resumed salvage operations on the La Galga."
2. The Juno
The thirty-four gun frigate, the Juno, was commissioned
into the Spanish Navy in 1790 where she sailed with a
squadron of other ships across the Atlantic to Cartagena."' The
Juno served Spain for ten years, traveling many of the same
routes as the La Galga in the Atlantic and Caribbean."4 On
October 19, 1802, during a mission to transport the Third
Battalion of the Regiment of Africa back to Spain, the Juno ran
into a deadly storm from which she would not recover."' The
storm caused the Juno to sink, taking with her four hundred
and thirty-two lives. 6 Shortly after the ship went down, Spain
launched an investigation into the sinking of the Juno but it
revealed nothing."' The Juno remained undisturbed at the
bottom of the Atlantic for approximately two hundred years
until discovered by Sea Hunt."8
B. The Parties Involved
After discovering what it believed to be the remains of
the La Galga and the Juno, Sea Hunt filed a verified complaint
in admiralty in rem against the two shipwrecks on March 11,
1998."' The complaint stated five counts:
1) that according to the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, the
Commonwealth of Virginia is the rightful owner of the shipwrecks,
and Sea Hunt is entitled to the rights granted to it by the Virginia
... See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
... See id.
13 See id.
114 See id.
1 See id.
See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
117 See id.
118 See id.
11 See id.
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Marine Resources Commission; 2) that Sea Hunt is entitled to a
liberal salvage award for voluntarily recovering artifacts which are
in "marine peril"; 3) that Sea Hunt is entitled to an injunction
prohibiting other salvors from attempting to recover artifacts from
the wreck; 4) that based on information and belief, the two wrecks
are the remains of the Spanish frigates JUNO and LA GALGA, and
Sea Hunt is entitled to declaratory judgment that Spain may no
longer exercise sovereign prerogative over the wrecked vessels; and
5) that Sea Hunt is entitled to declaratory judgment stating that no
government other than the Commonwealth of Virginia, including the
United States or any foreign sovereign, has *urisdiction to regulate
salvage operations over the two shipwrecks.
On March 12, 1998, the district court issued an arrest of the
two wrecks and appointed Sea Hunt the exclusive salvor until
further notice from the court.1
2
'
On May 13, 1998, Virginia filed a verified claim
asserting that it was the rightful owner of the shipwrecks
pursuant to the ASA, and that its rights were being exercised
through permits issued to Sea Hunt by the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission." Under the permits, Virginia granted
Sea Hunt permission to conduct salvage operations and to
recover artifacts from the shipwrecks.' On May 18, 1998, the
United States filed a motion to intervene on behalf of Spain
asserting ownership of the two shipwrecks.2 Moreover, the
United States also filed an answer asserting its own interests
in exercising regulatory authority over the shipwrecks.'
However, the district court denied both of the motions filed by
12o Id. at 681-82.
2 See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
' See id.
' See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 639.
1 See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 682. The United States intervened
on Spain's behalf because it believed it had an obligation under the Treaty of
Friendship and General Relations between the United States of America and Spain,
signed July 3, 1902. See id. at 682 n.2.
12 See id. The United States sought to give the National Park Service
regulatory authority over any salvage operations off the Assateague Island National
Seashore. See id.
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the United States.126 Spain obtained counsel and filed a verified
claim asserting ownership over the two shipwrecks. 1
7
The district court held that Virginia had title to the La
Galga under the ASA but that Spain retained title to the
Juno."' Under the ruling, Sea Hunt was allowed to continue its
salvage operations on the La Galga wreck according to the
terms of the permit issued by the Virginia Marine Resources
Commission; however, Sea Hunt was not allowed, without
Spain's permission, to continue salvage efforts on the Juno.9
C. The Decision of the District Court
The district court based its ruling on the Definitive
Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain, and Spain, °
the 1763 Treaty that ended the French and Indian War.13' The
district court reasoned that under Article XX of the 1763
Treaty, Spain had relinquished its claim to all its possessions
on the continent of North America, to the east and to the south
of the Mississippi River, including not only the land but
"everything that depends" on the land.12 In return for ceding to
Great Britain all of its possessions in North America, east and
south of the Mississippi River, Cuba was returned to Spain.33
The district court further explained that Great Britain was the
clear victor of the War in North America and that the terms of
the Treaty implied that Great Britain intended to obtain
complete control over all of North America east of the
Mississippi River.3 4 The district court stated that:
26 See id. at 683. On September 23, 1998, the district court denied the United
States motion to intervene on its own behalf and likewise denied the United State's
motion to intervene on behalf of Spain on September 25, 1998. See Sea Hunt I, 47 F.
Supp. 2d at 683.
. See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 638-40; Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
"' See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
1 See id.
130 Definitive Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1763, Fr.-Gr. Brit.-Spain, art. 20,
42 Consol. T.S. 331.
131 See Sea Hunt 1, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 689-90.
132 See id. at 689 (quoting Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 130, at art.XX).
13 See id.
134 See id.
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The sweeping language of Spain's cession in Article XX, together
with the background of the complete change of sovereignty in the
North American colonies, makes it unlikely that Spain intended to,
or would have been allowed by Great Britain to maintain a claim of
ownership over the wreck of LA GALGA off the coast of Virginia.3 5
The district court also pointed out. that the last sentence
of Article XX reserved for the King of Spain the right to "cause
all the effects that may belong to him, to be brought away,
whether it be artillery or other things." 8 The court explained
that Spain and Great Britain knew where the La Galga was
located, and therefore both countries knew that it would be
included in the cession of property.137 However, Spain made no
attempt to "bring away" any of the remains of the La Galga
after the Treaty was signed.3 s This led the district court to
conclude that Spain in effect had waived its right to carry the
remains away."3 9 The district court found that Spain had ceded
its rights over everything it owned in North America east of
the Mississippi River, including sunken vessels, in the
Treaty.140 Thus, the district court held that Spain abandoned
the La Galga, and that she therefore belonged to Virginia
under the terms of the ASA."
As for the Juno, the district court held that because it
sank in 1802, several years after the 1763 Treaty, it was not
ceded to anyone.4 2 The district court considered whether the
Treaty of 1819, which ended the War of 1812, constituted
evidence of express abandonment of the Juno by Spain. 3 The
district court concluded that the Treaty of 1819 was more
narrow in scope than the Treaty of 1763.' The court found
that under the 1819 Treaty, Spain ceded only "territories,"
namely Florida, and not "all that Spain possesses," as in the
... Id. at 689.
... Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (quoting Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra
note 130, at art. XX).
137 See id
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
"" Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
11 See id. at 689-92.
3 See id. at 690-91.
'44 See id. at 690.
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1763 Treaty. 5 Moreover, the court noted that the 1819 Treaty
described territory "Eastward of the Mississippi," similar to the
1763 Treaty, but the 1819 Treaty also clarified that the
territory being described was only that "known by the name of
East and West Florida.""6 The district court concluded that
since the Juno was located off the coast of Virginia, the 1819
Treaty did not affect it. 147 Thus, the court held that Spain did
not expressly abandon the Juno under the 1819 Treaty.
Furthermore, the district court also considered the
effect of the declaration of war between Spain and the United
States in 1898. The court held that Spain had not expressly
abandoned the Juno under the declaration because the United
States would have had to obtain actual control over the Juno to
warrant a wartime confiscation of an enemy vessel.4 9 Since
that never occurred, the district court held that the Juno was
not expressly abandoned and therefore Spain retained title to
it. 15
0
With respect to Sea Hunt's claim for a salvage award for
its salvage efforts on the Juno, the district court expressly
reserved that judgment pending supplemental briefs.'" The
district court ordered such filings because Spain indicated that
it wished to treat the Juno wreck as a maritime grave and did
not want the vessel to be salvaged.'52 The district court later
denied Sea Hunt the right to claim any salvage award because
Spain, the owner of the Juno, had expressly refused salvage
services."'
Spain appealed the district court's decision concerning
the La Galga. Virginia and Sea Hunt cross-appealed with
regard to the Juno and the denial of a salvage award."
145 See id.
14 Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 691.
150 See id. at 691-92.
'S' See Sea Hunt I, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
152 See id.
10Sea Hunt IIl, 221 F.3d at 640.
'
5 4 Id.
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D. The Decision of the Fourth Circuit
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed in part and affirmed in part.155 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling that Spain retained title to
the Juno and that Sea Hunt is not entitled to a salvage award;
however, the court reversed the district court's decision that
Virginia held title to the La Galga'56
The Fourth Circuit began its opinion with an
abandonment analysis.5 ' Virginia and Sea Hunt argued that
the ASA requires application of an "implied abandonment"
standard for wrecks located in coastal waters, and that under
such a standard, Spain has abandoned both shipwrecks. " ' The
court held that since Spain has stepped forward and asserted
ownership to the two shipwrecks, "express abandonment" is
the correct standard to be applied.'59 The court then noted that
the ASA does not define the critical term "abandonment," but
added that nothing in the Act sets out that implied
abandonment should be the standard when dealing with a
situation where a sovereign asserts ownership over one of its
own sunken vessels. 6 The court stated that the Act defined
"abandoned shipwrecks" as those that "the owner has
relinquished ownership rights with no retention" in an effort to
support its argument that express abandonment was the
correct standard.16' The court reasoned that the language of the
Act provides that a shipwreck is abandoned only where the
" Id. at 638.
1 Id.
157 See id. at 640 (noting that in order for Virginia to acquire title to
these wrecks, and in turn issue salvage permits, the ships must have been abandoned
by Spain). States can gain title to abandoned shipwrecks under the ASA, but to trigger
the ASA the wreck must be deemed abandoned. See discussion supra Parts I.E.1 and 2.
The court recognized that if the shipwrecks were abandoned, then Sea Hunt would be
entitled to control over them in accordance with the state-issued permits. See Sea Hunt
III, 221 F.3d at 640.
168 Id.
159 See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Columbus.America
Discovery Group called for such a standard and additionally noted that to adopt a
lower standard, such as implied abandonment, would go beyond what the ASA requires
and also abrogate America's obligations to Spain under the 1902 Treaty of Friendship
and General Relations. See id.
160 See id.
.
6 Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 640 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 2101(b)).
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owner relinquished ownership rights; and when an owner has
come forward and asserted ownership rights, the court argued
a finding of relinquishment is near impossible.162 Therefore, the
court argued that express abandonment was required."
The Fourth Circuit continued its abandonment analysis
by reviewing relevant case law.' The court noted that the
Supreme Court in its recent Brother Jonathan decision
declined to define abandonment but stated that "abandoned"
under the ASA was defined the same as in admiralty law.'s
The court found that under admiralty law, abandonment might
be inferred but that such an inference would be improper
should the owner appear.166 Sea Hunt and Virginia argued that
other circuits have provided for an implied abandonment
standard. 7 The Fourth Circuit, however, distinguished this
case, finding that none of the other cases involved an original
sovereign owner's claim to its shipwrecked vessel.'68
Finally, the court argued that an express abandonment
standard is further supported by Article X of the 1902 Treaty of
Friendship and General Relations.6 9 The court found that
under the Treaty, Spanish vessels were granted the same
immunities as similar vessels of the United States.' The court
then pointed to Article IV, Section 3, of the United States
Constitution, which states, "Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States."7' The court found that this Constitutional
clause precludes an implied abandonment standard of federal
lands and property because their disposition requires
... Id. at 640-41.
3 See id.
' See id. at 641-42.
' See id. at 641.
'66 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 641. The Fourth Circuit cited one of its own
earlier decisions, Columbus-America Discovery Group, as the basis for its conclusion.
See id. at 639. The Court countered Sea Hunt and Virginia's assertion that Columbus-
America Discovery Group is an anomaly by stating that the rule set forth in that case
reflects well-established admiralty law doctrine and existing case law. See id. at 641-
42.
"7 See id.
'8 See id.
16 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 642.
170 id.
1 See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. rV, § 3).
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congressional action. 72 The court reasoned that the clause was
also applicable for Spanish vessels.' The Fourth Circuit
therefore ruled that an express abandonment standard was the
proper standard to be applied in this case.'74
The Fourth Circuit continued its analysis by addressing
whether there was an express abandonment of the
shipwrecks.75 The court disagreed with the district court's
interpretation of Article XX of the 1763 Definitive Treaty of
Peace, and found that the plain language of that provision of
the Treaty contains no evidence of express abandonment of the
La Galga 6 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit noted that Spain's
cession of property in the Treaty was limited to all that Spain
possesses "on the continent of North America."'77 The court
asserted'that Spain therefore did not cede possessions in the
sea or seabed.78 Moreover, the court pointed out that Article
XX of the Treaty does not include any terms referring to
shipwrecks; yet in other provisions of the Treaty, reference is
made to ships and vessels.79 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
held that the language in Article XX of the Treaty, "on the
continent," did not include coastal waters as Sea Hunt and
Virginia argued it had.8' Similar to the previously mentioned
argument, 8' the Fourth Circuit stated that Article XX of the
Treaty makes no mention of the term "coast," yet in another
provision of the Treaty the term is explicitly used when
granting French Canada to Great Britain.8 2 Furthermore, in
response to the language in Article XX that provides Spain
ceded "every thing that depends on the said countries and
lands," the court maintained that this cannot be interpreted to
include shipwrecks." The court supported that position by
arguing that the eighteenth century understanding of
172 See id.
17 See id.
174 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 643.
175 See id. at 643-46.
176 See id at 643-44.
' Id. at 644.
178 See id.
"' See Sea Hunt II, 221 F.3d at 644.
'8 See id. at 645.
"'8Id. at 644; see also supra note 179 and accompanying text.
18 See Sea Hunt II, 221 F.3d at 645.
13 See id.
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"everything that depends" refers not to shipwrecks but rather
"dependencies" such as nearby islands.!" Finally, the Fourth
Circuit drew attention to the clause in Article XX, "his Catholic
Majesty shall have power to cause all the effects that may
belong to him, to be brought away, whether it be artillery or
other things."185 The court stated that this clause contains no
time limit, as did some of the other clauses in the Treaty.186 In
sum, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Article XX of the
Definitive Treaty of Peace does not contain clear and
convincing evidence of express abandonment of the La Galga.18 7
In an attempt to further support that conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit also noted that when parties to a treaty agree
on its interpretation, the court must, absent extraordinary
contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation.'88 The court
went one step further and stated that even if express
abandonment were not the controlling test in this case, in light
of the circumstances surrounding the La Galga, a finding of
implied abandonment would be improper.189 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court and held that Spain retains
title to the La Galga."90
As for the Juno, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court's holding that it was not expressly abandoned
under the 1819 Treaty and affirmed the district court's ruling
that title to the Juno remains with Spain. 9' The last issue the
Fourth Circuit addressed was whether Sea Hunt was entitled
to a salvage award for its salvage efforts on the Juno. 92 The
court stated that the owner of a vessel has the right to refuse
unwanted salvage.93 The court agreed with the district court's
finding that Sea Hunt knew the Juno was a Spanish ship and
that Spain might assert a claim of ownership and decline
'" See id.
1 Id. at 645-46 (quoting Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 130, at art.
XX). 18 Id. at 646.
187 Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 646.
" Id. (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982);
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999)).
" See id. at 647.
"90 See id.
"' See id. at 643 n.1.
"' See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 647-48 n.2.
19 Id.
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salvage." Thus, "[because Sea Hunt had prior knowledge of
Spain's ownership interests and had reason to expect Spain's
ownership claim and refusal to agree to salvage activity on
[Juno], Sea Hunt can not be entitled to any salvage award."'95
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Fourth Circuit's Standard of Abandonment
Analysis
This Part discusses the misguidance of the Sea Hunt III
decision and argues that under traditional admiralty law,
when an owner comes forward and asserts ownership to its
shipwreck, abandonment by inference is not improper.
Moreover, this Part argues that the Fourth Circuit diverged
from the weight of authority when it affirmed the district
court's denial of a salvage award.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that because Spain
asserted ownership to the shipwrecks, express abandonment is
the governing standard.' 96 The court further reasoned that to
allow an implied abandonment standard in such a case would
go beyond what the ASA requires.'97 The Court sought to justify
its position by noting that even though the ASA does not define
abandonment, nothing in the Act indicates that implied
abandonment should be the standard when a sovereign has
stepped forward and asserted ownership to its shipwreck.
198
The court pointed out that other courts have held that the ASA
"did not affect the meaning of 'abandoned.'"'99 The court also
noted that, according to the Supreme Court, "the meaning of
'abandoned' under the ASA conforms with its meaning under
S4 Id.
"Id. (quoting Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or
Vessels, No. 2:98cv281, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21752, at *13 (E.D. Va. June 25, 1999)
[hereinafter Sea Hunt II].
" See id. 640-43.
117 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 640-41.
"' See id. at 640.
19 Id. at 641 (quoting Fairport III, 177 F.3d at 499).
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admiralty law."' The Fourth Circuit then added that "[tihe
Supreme Court never suggested that by conferring title to the
states the ASA somehow altered the traditional admiralty
definition of abandonment.""' The court argued that under
traditional admiralty law, when "an owner" 202 comes forward
and asserts ownership of its vessel, express abandonment is
the proper standard.2 03 The court continued by contending that
an implied abandonment standard is permitted is some
situations, but not when an owner appears and asserts
ownership.2
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that an implied
abandonment standard is improper under traditional
admiralty law when an "owner appears" is misleading. The
court relies heavily on its earlier decision in Columbus-America
Discovery Group to arrive at this standard of abandonment;
however, the weight of traditional admiralty law recognizes
that abandonment may be found where circumstances give rise
to such an inference. 5 What remains unsettled is whether
200 Id. at 641 (quoting Brother Jonathan III, 523 U.S. at 508); see supra notes
90-98 and accompanying text.201 Id.
202 Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 641. There is an important distinction between
using the term "an owner," which may include a private owner, and using the term a
"sovereign owner," which will become apparent in the discussion. The court uses both
terms throughout its analysis in a misleading way.203 See id. (citing Columbus-America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d 450).
2o4 See id. (citing Columbus-America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d at 467-68).
20 Compare Columbus-America Discovery Gr., 974 F.2d at 464-65 (holding
that when an owner appears and asserts his ownership interest, abandonment must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence such as express declaration of abandonment)
with Fairport III, 177 F.3d at 499-500 (rejecting a doctrine of express abandonment
and holding that abandonment may be inferred for vessels formerly owned by private
parties); United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing
that an inference of abandonment can sometimes be found with non-use of private
property); Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1065 (stating that
abandonment may be inferred when circumstances give rise to such an inference, for
instance, when a vessels is "so long lost that time can be presumed to have eroded any
realistic claim of original title"); Treasure Salvors III, 640 F.2d at 567 (holding that
where property has been lost for a very long time, an original owner may be stripped of
title and that title vests by occupancy in the one who discovers it and reduces it to his
or her possession); Moyer v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known as Andrea Doria,
836 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. N.J. 1993) ("Abandonment may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence .... Factors such as lapse of time and nonuse by the owner
may give rise to an inference of an intent to abandon."); Chance v. Certain Artifacts
Found & Salvaged from the Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Ga. 1984)
("[I]nference of abandonment may arise from lapse of time and nonuse of the
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such an inference of abandonment is permitted when one of the
circumstances is that an owner appears and asserts its
ownership interest in a historic wreck. In virtually all of the
cases involving ancient shipwrecks, no prior owner has
appeared. Indeed, the Sea Hunt dispute marked the first time
Spain has ever stepped forward and asserted an ownership
interest to one of its sunken vessels. In the few cases where an
owner has appeared, other than the Fourth Circuit's own
decision in Columbus-America Discovery Group,05  courts
maintain that abandonment by inference is permitted if the
circumstances warrant it.
20 7
For example, in Columbus-America Discovery Group,
which involved parties stepping forward and asserting claims
of ownership, the district court stated that "whether property
has been abandoned is a question of intent, which may be
inferred from all of the relevant facts and circumstances."2 8
The court went on to state that "[in determining the question
of whether property has been abandoned, consideration must
be given to the property, the time, place and circumstances, the
actions and conduct of the parties, the opportunity or
expectancy of recovery and all other facts and
circumstances." 09
In Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Vessel, a ship which sank in 1860 was discovered by a salvor
who attempted to claim finder status and thus acquire title to
it under the law of finds.10 However, this claim of ownership
was disputed by the Lady Elgin Foundation who asserted it
had become the owner of the shipwreck pursuant to an
agreement with CIGNA Property & Casualty Insurance
Company.211 Lady Elgin alleged that CIGNA had transferred to
property."), affd. mem., 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985); Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or
Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 1960) (holding that lapse of
time and nonuse may give rise to an inference of abandonment).
2"6 This is to be contrasted with the district courtes decision in Columbus-
America Discovery Gr., 742 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Va. 1990).
207 See id.; Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 755 F.
Supp. 213 (N.D. IM. 1990).
208 742 F. Supp. at 1328-29, 1335.209 Id.
2:0 See Zych, 755 F. Supp. at 213-14.
21' See id. at 214.
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them the ownership interests in the wreck.212 Noting that the
case hinged on whether the ship was abandoned, the court
sought to clarify the standard under such circumstances.213 The
court stated:
Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of one's rights in a
property. It occurs "by an express or implied act of leaving or
deserting property without hope of recovering it and without the
intention of returning to it." It must be voluntary, with a positive
intent to part with ownership, and without coercion or pressure. To
show abandonment, a party must prove (1) intent to abandon, and
(2) physical acts carrying that intent into effect. Abandonment may
be inferred from all of the relevant facts and circumstances. A
finding of abandonment must be supported by strong and convincing
evidence, but it may, and often must, be determined on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
21 4
Thus, in Zych and Columbus-America, two district
courts followed the explicit principle announced repeatedly by
the weight of admiralty authority: abandonment may be
inferred when circumstances give rise to such an inference.1 5
An owner suddenly appearing to assert ownership over a
historic vessel is a circumstance to be taken into consideration
along with other recognized circumstances including non-use,
lapse of time, location of the wreck, and efforts by the owner to
recover the vessel. Indeed, the circumstance of an owner
appearing might result in a higher burden on the salvor to
demonstrate abandonment by inference. It does not, however,
trigger a per se rule, as the Fourth Circuit held in Sea Hunt
III, that there must be an express finding of abandonment
where an owner appears. The great weight of authority has not
adopted any bright-line rules for findings of abandonment-its
approach has always been, and continues to be, based upon the
totality of the circumstances. 6
The Fourth Circuit improperly states in Sea Hunt III
that traditional admiralty law does not permit an implied
abandonment standard when an owner appears. Although the
vast majority of courts allowing abandonment by inference
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 Id.
215 See cases cited supra note 205.
216 Id.
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have not yet been faced with an appearance by an owner
claiming ownership rights to its shipwreck, nothing suggests
that those courts would be opposed to such an abandonment
standard as the Fourth Circuit mistakenly concludes. To the
contrary, the weight of precedent indicates courts would permit
abandonment by inference if all the circumstances taken into
consideration warrant it. 217 The Fourth Circuit's requirement of
express abandonment has even been openly criticized as a
departure from the traditional admiralty law analysis of
abandonment.218
In an attempt to further distinguish this weight of
authority, the court argues that Sea Hunt and Virginia are
unable to point the court to any case applying an implied
abandonment standard where a "sovereign owner"219 has come
forward and asserted ownership to its property. Here, the court
has a valid point. There is some authority for an express
abandonment standard when a "sovereign owner" asserts
ownership to its vessel.22' The ASA Guidelines explicitly
address the abandonment standard to be afforded to foreign
sovereign vessels:
Although a sunken warship or other vessel entitled to sovereign
immunity often appears to have been abandoned by the flag nation,
regardless of its location, it remains the property of the nation to
which it belonged at the time of sinking unless that nation has taken
formal action to abandon it or to transfer title to another party.
221
217 See id.
211 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. In rejecting the holding of the
Fourth Circuit in Columbus-America, which required an express renunciation of
ownership in order to establish abandonment, the Fairport III court stated that "[r]igid
adherence to a doctrine requiring express abandonment would require courts to
'stretch 0 a fiction to absurd lengths.'" 177 F.3d at 500. Moreover, the court in Brother
Jonathan II stated that when the Fourth Circuit held that abandonment can only be
found by express renunciation of ownership it introduced a significant modification
into maritime law. 102 F.3d 379, 388 (9th Cir. 1996) affd in part, vac. in part, 523 U.S.
491 (1998).
219 This is to be contrasted with the court's use of the term "an owner," which
could include private owners. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
220 See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947) (holding that Art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution holds that the United States cannot abandon its own
property except by explicit acts); Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 222 (holding that the United
States confederate warship Alabama can only be abandoned by an explicit act); see also
Abandoned Shipwreck Act Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 50,116, 50,121 and 50,124 (1990)
[hereinafter ASA Guidelines].
22'ASA Guidelines, supra note 220, at 50,121.
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Moreover, in a 1980 letter by James H. Michel, Deputy Legal
Advisor of the Department of State, responding to a request for
the Department's views on the ownership rights acquired, if
any, by the United States to Japanese vessels sunk by the
United States during World War II, Michel wrote:
The practice of the U.S. and other countries in recent years has been
to depart from the earlier view that abandonment of a warship could
be implied by the long passage of time.... It is clear that under
well-established State practice, States generally do not lose legal
title over sunken warships through the mere passage of time in the
absence of abandonment.... Although abandonment may be implied
under some circumstances, United States warships that were sunk
during military hostilities are presumed not to be abandoned.2
However, it is worth noting that even in the case of a
"sovereign owner" stepping forward and claiming ownership,
the law is still somewhat unsettled when the sovereign is not
the United States. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, there has
been no case yet permitting an inferential abandonment
standard where a claim of ownership was made by a "sovereign
owner." Some circuits have come close to announcing a position
but have avoided doing so. For example, the Sixth Circuit in
Fairport III expressly limited its holding that implied
abandonment is permitted for vessels previously owned by
"private parties" and it declined to express a view as to vessels
owned by a sovereign.2  In Martha's Vineyard Scuba
Headquarters, the First Circuit held that a vessel may be "so
long lost that time can be presumed to have eroded any
realistic claim of original title," and it went on to say that after
the action in rem was brought against the ship and its
contents, "no person or firm appeared to assert any overall
claim of ownership." But the court did not address whether
the inferential abandonment standard would have applied had
a sovereign appeared to assert an ownership claim.m Likewise,
other circuits have not spoken precisely on the issue. Even the
122 MATION NASH LEICH, 1980 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw at 1004-05 (quoting a memorandum by James H. Michel, Deputy
Legal Advisor of the Department of State).
223 177 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 1999).
224 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987).
25 see id.
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1980 State Department letter,26 stating that it has been the
practice of the United States and other nations in recent years
to reject the idea that there can be abandonment by inference
of warships by the long passage of time, still acknowledges in
its conclusion that "abandonment by inference may be implied
under some circumstances." 7 The closest corollary to the
judicial treatment of foreign shipwrecks with respect to the
applicable abandonment standard comes from United States v.
Steinmetz' and United States v. California," which, taken
together, establish how shipwrecks of the sovereign, the United
States, are to be treated.20 Moreover, although the ASA is
silent on the issue, the ASA Guidelines do provide some
guidance."
The Fourth Circuit would have been more accurate had
it stated that an implied abandonment is improper should a
"sovereign owner" come forward and assert ownership, rather
than stating that should "an owner" appear and claim
ownership over the property, abandonment by inference is not
permitted under admiralty law. The term "an owner" indicates
a private as well as a sovereign owner and, under admiralty
law, the distinction is important. In determining the
precedential value of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sea Hunt
III, it is more accurate to state that an express abandonment
standard is proper when a "sovereign owner," as opposed to
simply "an owner," has stepped forward and asserted
ownership interests over its shipwreck.
As it turns out, the Fourth Circuit was able to offer an
additional factor in the Sea Hunt III case requiring the
application of an express abandonment standard. The court
pointed out that Article X of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and
General Relations between the United States and Spain
requires an express abandonment standard.232 Article X
provides, "[in cases of shipwreck.., each party shall afford to
the vessels of the other.., the same assistance and protection
226 See supra Part IM.A.
227 LEICH, supra note 222, at 1004-05.
228 973 F.2d 212 (3d cir. 1992).
229 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
'02 See cases cited supra note 220.
231 See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
22 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 642.
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and the same immunities which would have been granted to its
own vessels in similar cases.""3
The court noted that the language of the treaty requires
that imperiled Spanish vessels shall receive the same
immunities given to similarly situated vessels of the United
States.24 The court then presented an analysis of the
immunities conferred upon U.S. vessels and concluded that
they may only be abandoned by an "express, unambiguous, and
affirmative act."235 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that under the
terms of the 1902 Treaty, requiring that imperiled Spanish
vessels are to receive the same immunities given to similarly
situated vessels of the United States, Spain can only abandon
its vessels by express renunciation. 236 Having determined that
an express abandonment standard will govern, the court then
addressed whether the La Galga and the Juno had been
expressly abandoned.2 7 After concluding that neither ship had
been expressly abandoned, rendering the ASA and the law of
finds inapplicable, the court briefly considered the alternative
admiralty action-Sea Hunt's salvage award claim.28
Treaty of Friendship and General Relations, July 3, 1902, U.S.-Spain, 33
Stat. 2105, 2110-11.234 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 642.
23 Id. In reaching this conclusion the court referred to art. IV, § 3 of the
Constitution which states that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The court concluded that this article of the
Constitution precludes a finding of implied abandonment of federal lands and property
and instead requires some congressional action for dispositions of federal property. See
Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 642. The court also noted that the Third Circuit has held that
the United States cannot abandon its own property except by explicit acts. See id.
(citing Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 222). Moreover, the court argued that the Supreme Court
has recognized that art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution holds that the Unites States cannot
abandon its own property except by explicit acts. See id. (citing California, 332 U.S. at
27).
2 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 643.
23' See id. at 643.
"s See id. at 647-48.
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B. The Fourth Circuit's Denial of a Salvage Award
Here again, the Fourth Circuit diverged from the weight
of authority when it affirmed the district court's denial of a
salvage award for Sea Hunt's salvage services on the Juno and
held:
It is the right of the owner of any vessel to refuse unwanted salvage.
Sea Hunt knew before bringing this action that the JUNO was a
Spanish ship and that Spain might make a claim of ownership and
decline salvage .... Because Sea Hunt had prior knowledge of
Spain's ownership interests and had reason to expect Spain's
ownership claim and refusal to agree to salvage activity on JUNO,
Sea Hunt cannot be entitled to any salvage award.u 9
The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize that all of the necessary
elements for a valid salvage claim were present: there was a
voluntary and successful salvage of the marine periled Juno. °
First, the Juno was in marine peril. It is well
established that shipwrecks, and/or their artifacts, still lying at
the bottom of the sea are in marine peril.241 Second, Sea Hunt
had also performed successful salvage services on the Juno.
Sea Hunt had successfully salvaged two anchors, a cannon,
and several coins during its attempt to positively identify the
shipwreck as the Juno.42 Sea Hunt had successfully salved
part of the shipwreck believed to be the Juno and its efforts
had contributed to its eventual preservation.243 Finally, Sea
Hunt's salvage services were voluntary as it had no duty or
obligation, legal or otherwise, to provide these services.244
" Id. at n.2.
210 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on what
constitutes marine peril.
212 See Joint Opening Brief of Appellees Commonwealth of Virginia and Sea
Hunt, Inc. at 55, Sea Hunt III (No. 99-2035) [hereinafter Joint Opening Briefl.
24 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
requirements of successful salvage; see also The Annie Lord, 251 F. 157, 159 (D. Mass.
1917) (stating that "It is not necessary, in order to establish a claim to salvage, that a
salvor should actually complete the work to save property at risk.... It is sufficient if
he endeavors to do so, and his efforts have a causal relation to the eventual
preservation of it.").
24 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for a discussion on the what
constitutes voluntary salvage services.
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The Fourth Circuit did not discuss whether Sea Hunt
had established the existence of these three necessary
elements. Rather, it affirmed the district court's ruling that a
salvage award was not permitted because Spain had properly
refused the salvage activity. u5 Whether Spain, under the law of
salvage, had properly refused Sea Hunt's salvage activity was
a major point of contention between the parties. The Fourth
Circuit diverged from majority view in deciding this issue.
Sea Hunt argued that "only owners in actual possession
of vessels may refuse salvage."?6 Sea Hunt noted that in cases
where salvage has been properly refused the owner was in
actual possession of the vessel and could therefore respond to
the marine peril.247 However, Sea Hunt argued that when the
owner is not in actual possession and consequently cannot
respond to the marine peril, salvage cannot be refused. 8
Spain, on the other hand, argued that under traditional
admiralty law principles, when the owner of a vessel
unequivocally rejects salvage services, the owner has a broad
right to refuse unwanted salvage. 9 Contending that a
"doctrine of rejection," giving owners or persons with authority
the right to communicate refusal, has been embraced by
American courts of admiralty, Spain argued that it had the
right to refuse Sea Hunt's salvage activity despite its lack of
actual possession of the Juno.50
The district court sided with Spain on this issue. 1
However, whether an owner can reject salvage services when
not in actual control or possession of the marine periled vessel
is unsettled. Most traditional admiralty law cases have dealt
with owners who were in actual possession when rejecting
salvage services.252 Legal disputes regarding the rejection of
salvage services on shipwrecks did not arise until the present
245 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 647.2
4 Joint Opening Brief, supra note 242, at 49.
247 See id.
248 See id. at 49-50.
249 See Answering and Reply Brief of Intervenor-Appellant and Cross-
Appellee The Kingdom of Spain at 41-42, Sea Hunt III (No. 99-2035) [hereinafter
Answering and Reply Brief].2 0 See id.
2 11 See Sea Hunt II, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21752, at *4-5.
212 See id.
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time because the technology to locate shipwrecks and bring
them to the surface did not exist.2
3
The weight of authority holds that owners of vessels
sometimes have the right to refuse salvage but, in order to do
so, the owner must be in actual control and possession of the
ship and the vessel cannot be in a state of peril 4.2 " However,
there seems to be a developing body of authority directly in
conflict with this majority position. Most recently, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court in Int'l Aircraft Recovery,
LL. C. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Aircraft and
held that "the law of salvage [permits] the owner of a vessel in
marine peril to decline the assistance of others so long as only
the owner's property interests are at stake."25
Although the Fourth Circuit sided with the minority
position on this salvage law issue by holding that Spain could
refuse salvage despite the fact that it was not in actual control
or possession of the marine periled Juno, another circuit,
following the majority view, would likely find that Sea Hunt
had a valid salvage claim." Thus, the question left
See Joseph C. Sweeney, An Overview of Commercial Salvage Principles in
the Context of Marine Archaeology, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 185, 195 (Apr. 1999).2r4 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text; see also The Laura, 81 U.S.
336, 344-45 (1871); The Barque Island City, 66 U.S. 121, 128 (1861); MARTIN J.
NORRIS, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY: SALVAGE § 136 (rev. 7th ed. 1999); THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW: SALVAGE § 16-1 (2d. ed. 1994);
Sweeney, supra note 253, at 193-95. This view can also be found in jurisprudence as
recent as July 1999. See Int'l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Aircraft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that even if
the United States Navy still owns its historic aircraft it could not refuse salvage on it
where the property was in marine peril and the owner has not made adequate
provisions for a rescue). The court also noted that numerous courts have held that that
any owner may not refuse salvage services if marine peril exists. See id. at 1180.
2w Int'l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. The
Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 695 F.2d 893, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that a
"salvage award may be denied if the salvor forces its services on a vessel despite
rejection of them by a person with authority over the vessel").
In addition to meeting the three necessary elements for a valid salvage
claim, a voluntary and successful salvage of the marine periled Juno, Spain under the
majority view did not properly refuse salvage services. Spain has not been in control or
possession of the Juno since its sinking in 1802. Moreover, a risk to the property does
exist independent of one that could be caused by the vessels owner, the risk of marine
peril. Spain is not in control or possession of the Juno and thus is in no position to
respond to the marine peril itself and Spain, at the time of the salvage services were
rendered, had made no provisions for rescuing the Juno from such peril. Thus, under
the law of salvage, Spain could not lawfully refuse salvage services on the Juno. See
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unanswered by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sea Hunt III is
whether Article X of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and
General Relations between the United States and Spain will
preclude a salvage award for salvage services rendered on its
sovereign vessels. " This is an important question because an
estimated 600 Spanish vessels were lost in the coastal waters
of the United States, an area frequently subject to salvage
operations.258
Article X of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General
Relations between the United States and Spain governs how
Spain's sovereign shipwrecks are to be treated.259 As the Fourth
Circuit established, Article X requires that imperiled Spanish
vessels receive the same immunities given to similarly situated
vessels of the United States.260 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis of the immunities conferred upon U.S. vessels led it to
conclude that Spain must expressly abandon its sovereign
vessels.2 1' The answer to the question of whether a salvor can
bring a salvage award action for salvage services on a Spanish
sovereign vessel thus lies in what immunities are conferred
upon United States vessels with respect to salvage award
claims.
The United States, by statute, has waived its sovereign
immunity with respect to salvage services rendered on its
vessels.262 Section 781 of the Public Vessels Act provides:
A libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United
States, or a petition impleading the United States, for damages
caused by a public vessel of the United States, and for compensation
for towage and salvage services, including contract salvage, rendered
to a public vessel of the United States.36
authority cited supra note 254.
7This question is left unanswered by the Fourth Circuit because the court
did not have to deal with it since it held that Spain had properly refused salvage
services.
258 William J. Broad, Court Ruling on Spanish Frigates Foils Modern-Day
Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2000, at Al.
259 See Treaty of Friendship and General Relations, supra note 233.
26 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 643.
261 Id.
262 See 46 U.S.C. § 781 (2000); see also Helgesen v. United States, 275 F. Supp.
789, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stating that suits based on admiralty claims may be brought
against the United States under the various statutes including the Public Vessels Act).
26 46 U.S.C. § 781.
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Consistent with the Public Vessels Act, the United States has
allowed salvors to maintain salvage award actions for salvage
services on public vessels of the United States. For example, in
Petition of United States, suit was brought under the Public
Vessels Act for salvage services rendered on a Coast Guard
vessel.2" The court held that a claim under the law of salvage
could be presented on proper presentation of the issues.265
Similarly, in Lago Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, an
action was permitted against the United States for salvage
services rendered on a tanker owned by the United States, a
public vessel.266 Thus, as case law demonstrates, a salvage
award action may be brought against the United States.
Accordingly, by extension of the same immunities given to
imperiled Spanish vessels as those that are given to such
vessels of the United States, Sea Hunt would not have been
precluded under Article X of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and
General Relations from bringing a salvage award claim.
Even an argument by Spain that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA") 267 would bar Sea Hunt's salvage claim
would lack merit.266 Section 1605(a)(1) provides that "a foreign
state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case . . .in which the
foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication .. "269 Although this clause has been narrowly
interpreted by courts, which require strong evidence that a
foreign state has intended to waive its sovereign immunity,
Spain has provided strong evidence of its intention to waive its
21 See 216 F. Supp. 775, 775 (D. Or. 1963).2
" See id at 784.
266 See 218 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1955).
"See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).268 The FSIA codified the principal of sovereign immunity, recognized by Chief
Justice Marshall in the 1812 case The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116
(1812). The Chief Justice in that case held that sovereign nations are not subject to
judicial process without their express consent. See id.; see also Answering and Reply
Brief of Intervenor - Appellant and Cross-Appellee The Kingdom of Spain at 35. The
FSIA's implicit waiver clause recognizes the principal announced by Chief Justice
Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, that foreign sovereign immunity can be waived.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000).
269 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
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sovereign immunity.Y Such evidence is found in the 1902
Treaty, where Spain unequivocally and expressly waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to its imperiled vessels.27 1 It
did so when it agreed that its imperiled vessels are to receive
the same protections and immunities given to similarly
situated vessels of the United States.27 2 Thus, if the United
States were to waive its sovereign immunity, as it later did for
actions based on salvage services rendered on its public
vessels, Spain understood that its immunity would also be
waived. 273 Therefore, under Article X of the 1902 Treaty of
Friendship and General Relations, Spain has, in so much as
the United States has, waived its sovereign immunity for
actions brought against it for salvage services rendered on one
of its sovereign vessels.
CONCLUSION
The vast developments in undersea technology are
opening up the wonders beneath the sea to the peering eyes of
the world. As technology continues to develop, one can easily
imagine that even a basketball at the bottom of the deep sea
can be located. This technology has allowed salvors to locate
historic shipwrecks once thought lost forever; but while many
of these discoveries preserve a piece of history, they also
disturb it. Indeed, legal battles have ensued over whether
salvors can and/or should disturb these shipwrecks, and the
need to protect historic shipwrecks as cultural resources was a
major factor in passing the ASA.274
Each shipwreck presents a complicated, and often
unique, set of legal issues. Many of those legal issues have
been addressed over the years and a body of admiralty law has
evolved concerning legal rights over historic shipwrecks. This
body of admiralty law, together with the passage of the ASA,
has provided many of the answers to the legal questions that
270 See e.g., Corporacion Mexicana De Servicios Maritimos v. The MiT
RESPECT, 89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Transnave Inc., 8 F.3d 284 (5th
Cir. 1993); see also Answering and Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 40.
271 See Treaty of Friendship and General Relations, supra note 233.272 See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 643.273 See supra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
24 See supra Part II.E.
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arise under the laws governing shipwrecks. However, as the
Sea Hunt III case illustrates, there are many questions still in
dispute or left unanswered.
First, a split in the circuits has developed as to under
what circumstances abandonment of a shipwreck may be
hnplied. 5 Adding to that confusion, the question of whether
abandonment by inference is improper when "an owner
appears and asserts ownership to its long lost shipwreck is now
ripe for dispute due to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Sea Hunt
III. The weight of traditional admiralty law suggests that
abandonment by inference, under the right circumstances,
would not be improper even though "an owner" appears and
asserts ownership to its vessel. 6 However, when the owner is a
"sovereign," the sparse existing authority does indicate that
abandonment by inference under such a circumstance would be
improper. Still, questions involving the standard of
abandonment to be applied when owners appear, both private
and sovereign, are in the initial stages of development and are
sure to spark legal battles in the coming years, especially given
the Fourth Circuit's Sea Hunt III decision.
Second, the question of whether an owner not in actual
control or possession of a periled vessel can refuse salvage has
currently produced conflicting authority as well. 7' The Fourth
Circuit sided with the minority position on this issue, and in
doing so increased the weight of authority taking the position
that an owner need not be in actual possession or control to
reject salvage services as the owner has a broad right to refuse
such services. This increasingly developing split of authority is
sure to produce legal disputes.
Finally, if an owner has a valid salvage claim on a
sovereign vessel of Spain, does the 1902 Treaty of Friendship
and General Relations between the United States and Spain
preclude the salvor from bringing a salvage award action?
Although the Fourth Circuit did not have to face this question,
since it held that Spain had properly refused Sea Hunt's
salvage activities, with hundreds of Spanish shipwrecks still
lying at the bottom of the sea in the coastal waters of the
See supra notes 24 -25 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Part III.A.
2n See supra Part III.B.
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United States, this question is sure to arise in the future. An
analysis of the 1902 Treaty indicates that Spain has waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to salvage actions brought
against it for salvage services rendered on its sovereign
vessels.27
In addition to furthering the split in authority over the
proper standard of abandonment to be applied in various
contexts and how an owner can suitably refuse salvage
activities, the Fourth Circuit's Sea Hunt III decision also has
other effects. Namely, the decision will likely discourage future
salvage operations. Many salvors will view this decision as a
threat to their glorious days of treasure hunting. Salvors now
run the risk of spending considerable amounts of time and
money locating and salvaging shipwrecks without the
possibility of any profit. Additionally, the possibility that a
salvor will not even receive compensation by way of a salvage
award for the time and money it spent, thus putting them at
risk of not even breaking even, has the potential of further
squashing any remaining profit incentive. Without that profit
incentive, many salvors will no longer engage in these salvage
expeditions and, consequently, society will lose out on the
benefits of recovering historical artifacts.279
By recovering historic objects a piece of history is
preserved. Historic shipwreck artifacts provide a portal to the
cultures of the past, a portal that facilitates an understanding
and preservation of past cultures. Indeed, "the past ... plays
an important role in the present [because] we use the past as
an orientation to our own lives."20 Through the preservation
and examination of historic shipwreck artifacts, we are able to
study human civilization-in many instances of cultures that
have vanished."' Shipwrecks allow us to study "a lost
dimension of history: man's encounter with the sea and the role
which this has played in the development of human
'
78 See supra Part III.B.
7I say "many" and not "all" in recognition that some salvors may endeavor in
such expeditions for reasons beyond the potential for profit. Some salvors may
undertake such operations in an effort to preserve historical and archaeological objects
and information.
280 See PETER THROCKMORTON, THE SEA REMEMBERS: SHIPWRECKS AND
ARCHAEOLOGY FROM HOMER'S GREECE TO THE REDISCOVERY OF THE TITANIC 226
(1996).
281 See id. at 9.
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civilization."12  Shipwrecks provide this cultural glimpse
because they often contain "an entire cross section of life
'frozen' intact in time,"2 and preservation of culture is
important given the increasing homogeneity of cultures in our
modern world.
Yet, while there are obvious historical and cultural
benefits to promoting salvage expeditions, there are also
legitimate concerns. Many believe, as did Spain in Sea Hunt
III, that these historic shipwrecks are maritime graves of the
brave souls who went down with the ship. As maritime graves,
the sentiment exists that these wrecks should not be explored
or exploited. The concern also exists, as argued by the United
States, that the United States has thousands of lost vessels
that it too would like other countries and parties to treat as
honored maritime graves." Additionally, the call for
international cooperation is becoming increasingly important
as the vast advancements in technology increase the frequency
and ease of salvaging sunken ships. The stage for such
cooperation was set in Sea Hunt III. Indeed, the call from
Spain to recognize the La Galga and the Juno as maritime
graves and the first ever request from Spain for international
cooperation, which the United States sought to comply with,
likely played a role in the Fourth Circuit's willingness to
diverge from traditional admiralty law.
Kevin Bereant
Id. at 7.
mId. at 10.
2See Broad, supra note 258, at Al.
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